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1 Introduction
We study the variability of business growth rates in the U.S. economy
from 1976 onwards. To carry out our study, we exploit the recently
developed Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) (Jarmin and Miranda
2002a), which contains annual observations on employment and pay-
roll for all establishments and firms in the private sector. Compared to
other longitudinal business databases for the United States, the LBD is
unparalleled in its comprehensive coverage over an extended period of
time. The underlying sources for the LBD are periodic business surveys
conducted by the Census Bureau and federal government administra-
tive records.
1
Macroeconomists increasingly recognize the importance of inter-
actions between aggregate economic performance and the volatility
and heterogeneity of business level outcomes. Idiosyncratic shocks
are central to modern theories of unemployment. Frictions in product,
factor and credit markets that impede business responses to idiosyn-
cratic shocks can raise unemployment, lower productivity and depress
investment. Financial innovations that facilitate better risk sharing can
simultaneously encourage risk taking and investment, amplify business
level volatility, and promote growth. Several recent studies hypothesize
a close connection between declining aggregate volatility and trends in
business level volatility. These examples of interactions between busi-
ness level and aggregate outcomes help motivate our empirical study.
Our chief objective is to develop a robust set of facts about the magni-
tude and evolution of business level volatility and the cross sectional
dispersion of business growth rates in the U.S. economy.108 Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
Previous empirical work in this area yields an unclear picture. Sev-
eral recent studies find a secular rise in average volatility among pub-
licly traded firms. Examples include Campbell et al. (2001), Chaney,
Gabaix, and Philippon (2002), Comin and Mulani (2006), and Comin
and Philippon (2005). In figure 2.1, we replicate a key finding from the
latter two studies. The figure shows that the average magnitudes of
firm level volatility in the growth rates of sales and employment have
roughly doubled since the early 1960s.
2 In a different line of research,
Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006) and Faberman (2006) pro-
duce evidence of a downward trend in the excess job reallocation rate,
a measure of cross sectional dispersion in establishment growth rates.
3
As seen in the top panel of figure 2.2, the quarterly excess job realloca-
tion rate in the U.S. manufacturing sector fell from about 12 percent in
the early 1960s to 8 percent by 2005. The shorter time series in the lower
panel shows a decline in excess job reallocation for the U.S. private sec-
tor from 16 percent or more in the early 1990s to less than 14 percent
by 2005.
4 The data underlying figure 2.2 are not restricted to publicly
traded firms.
There is an unresolved tension between the evidence of rising firm
level volatility and declining cross sectional dispersion in establishment
growth rates. To appreciate the tension, consider a simple example in
which all employers follow identical and independent autoregressive
processes. Then an increase in the innovation variance of idiosyncratic
shocks implies an increase in employer volatility and in the cross sec-
tional dispersion of growth rates. Of course, it is possible to break the
tight link between employer volatility and cross sectional dispersion in
more complicated specifications. It is also possible that firm and estab-
lishment growth processes have evolved along sharply different paths
in recent decades. Yet another possibility is that the restriction to pub-
licly traded businesses in previous studies paints a misleading picture
of firm level volatility trends in the economy as a whole.
5 A related pos-
sibility is that the economic selection process governing entry into the
set of publicly traded firms has changed over time in ways that affect
measured trends in volatility.
In what follows, we explore each of these issues. We find similar
trends in cross sectional dispersion and firm level volatility, so the dif-
ferent measures cannot account for the contrast between figures 2.1 and
2.2. Instead, the resolution turns mainly on the distinction between pub-
licly traded and privately held businesses. For the private nonfarm sec-
tor as a whole, both firm level volatility and cross sectional dispersionVolatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates 109
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measures show large declines in recent decades. For publicly traded
firms, we provide independent evidence that cross sectional dispersion
and firm level volatility have risen during the period covered by the
LBD. We also show, however, that this rise for publicly traded firms
is overwhelmed by the dramatic decline among privately held firms,
which account for more than two-thirds of private business employ-
ment. Very similar results obtain when we treat establishments, rather
than firms, as the unit of observation.
Two basic patterns hold across major industry groups. First, the vola-
tility and dispersion of business growth rates are considerably greater
for privately held firms. As of 1978, the average standard deviation of
firm-level employment growth rates is 3.7 times larger for privately
held than for publicly traded firms. This volatility ratio ranges from 2.3
in Services to 6.3 in Transportation and Public Utilities. Second, volatil-
ity and dispersion decline sharply among privately held businesses in
the period covered by the LBD, and they rise sharply among publicly
traded firms. The overall private-public volatility ratio falls to 1.6 by
2001, and it drops sharply in every major industry group. We refer to
this phenomenon as "volatility convergence."
We also provide proximate explanations for these patterns. First,
much of the decline in dispersion and volatility for the private sector
as a whole, and for privately held firms in particular, reflects a decline
in (employment-weighted) business entry and exit rates. Second, the
age distribution of employment among privately held firms shifted
towards older businesses in the period covered by the LBD. Because
volatility declines steeply with age, the shift toward older businesses
brought about a decline in overall volatility. We estimate that 27 per-
cent or more of the volatility decline among privately held firms reflects
the shift toward older businesses. Third, the evolution toward larger
firms in certain industries, especially Retail Trade, accounts for about
10 percent of the volatility decline among nonfarm businesses during
the period covered by the LBD.
Fourth, and perhaps most striking, changes over time in the number
and character of newly listed firms played a major role in the volatil-
ity rise among publicly traded firms and in the volatility convergence
phenomenon. There was a large influx of newly listed firms after 1979,
and newly listed firms are much more volatile than seasoned listings.
Moreover, firms newly listed in the 1980s and 1990s exhibit much
greater volatility than earlier cohorts. Indeed, simple cohort dummies
for the year of first listing in COMPUSTAT account for 67 percent of the112 Davis, Haitiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
volatility rise among publicly traded firms from 1978 to 2001, and they
account for 90 percent of the smaller rise over the 1951-2004 period
spanned by COMPUSTAT. Other evidence discussed below also points
to important changes over time in the selection of firms that become
public.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the role of idiosyn-
cratic shocks, producer heterogeneity and risk-taking in selected theo-
ries of growth, fluctuations and unemployment. Section 2 also identifies
several factors that influence business volatility and its connection to
aggregate volatility. Section 3 describes our data and measurement pro-
cedures. Section 4 presents our main empirical findings on volatility
and cross sectional dispersion in business outcomes. Section 5 explores
various factors that help to amplify and explain our main findings. Sec-
tion 6 offers concluding remarks.
2 Conceptual Underpinnings and Theoretical Connections
Theories of growth and fluctuations in the Schumpeterian mold envision
a market economy constantly disturbed by technological and commer-
cial innovations. Firms and workers differ in their capacities to create,
adopt and respond to these innovations, so that winners and losers
emerge as unavoidable by-products of economic progress. According
to this view, an economy's long-term growth rate depends on how well
it facilitates and responds to the process of creative destruction (Aghion
and Howitt 1998). Institutions and policies that impede restructuring
and adjustment can mute the disruptive nature of factor reallocation—
at the cost of lower productivity, depressed investment and, in some
circumstances, persistently high unemployment (Caballero 2006).
Empirical evidence supports the Schumpeterian view in its broad
outlines. Large-scale job reallocation is a pervasive feature of market
economies (Davis and Haltiwanger 1999). The large job flows and
high firm level volatility reflect the restructuring, experimentation and
adjustment processes at the heart of Schumpeterian theories. Empiri-
cally, gross job flows are dominated by reallocation within narrowly
defined sectors, even in countries that undergo massive structural
transformations. Thus longitudinal firm and establishment data are
essential for helping gauge the pace of restructuring and reallocation.
Empirical studies also find that excess job reallocation rates decline
strongly during the early lifecycle of firms and establishments (Davis
and Haltiwanger (1992), and Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and ScarpettaVolatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates 113
(2004)). This finding indicates that experimentation and adjustment in
the face of uncertainty about demand, technologies, costs, and manage-
rial ability are especially pronounced among younger businesses.
A closely related empirical literature highlights the role of factor real-
location in productivity growth. Over horizons of five or ten years, the
reallocation of inputs and outputs from less to more productive business
units typically accounts for a sizable fraction of industry-level produc-
tivity growth (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan 2001). Several studies
reviewed in Caballero (2006, chapter 2) provide evidence that trade
barriers, entry barriers, impediments to labor mobility, and misdirected
financing can hamper efficient factor reallocation and, as a result, retard
restructuring and undermine productivity growth. In short, there are
sound theoretical and empirical reasons to treat restructuring and fac-
tor reallocation as key aspects of growth and fluctuations. The busi-
ness volatility and dispersion measures that we construct in this study
capture the pace of restructuring and reallocation on important dimen-
sions. In this respect, they are useful inputs into theories of growth and
fluctuations in the Schumpeterian mold.
Theories of unemployment based on search and matching frictions
(Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000)) rely on idiosyn-
cratic shocks to drive job destruction and match dissolution. A greater
intensity of idiosyncratic shocks in these models produces higher match
dissolution rates and increased flows of workers into the unemploy-
ment pool. The measures of employer volatility and dispersion that we
consider provide empirical indicators for the intensity of idiosyncratic
shocks. Evidence regarding trends in these indicators can serve as use-
ful inputs into theoretical explanations for longer term movements in
the rates of unemployment and match dissolution. These indicators
also provide grist for empirical studies of how long term changes in
idiosyncratic shock intensity affect unemployment.
Another class of theories stresses the impact of risk-sharing oppor-
tunities on the willingness to undertake risky investments. Obstfeld
(1994), for example, shows that better diversification opportunities
induce a portfolio shift by risk-averse investors toward riskier proj-
ects with higher expected returns. Greater portfolio diversification also
weakens one motive for organizing production activity around large,
internally diversified firms. On both counts, improved opportunities
for diversification lead to more volatility and dispersion in producer
outcomes. Empirical indicators of increased financial diversification
include the rise of mutual funds and institutional investors, lower114 Davis, Haitiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
trading costs for financial securities, higher stock market participation
rates by households, and greater cross-border equity holdings. Moti-
vated in part by these developments, Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) build
a model whereby a bigger pool of portfolio investors encourages listed
firms to adopt riskier business strategies with greater expected profits.
More aggressive risk-taking by listed firms also leads unlisted firms
to adopt riskier strategies in their model, raising firm level volatility
throughout the economy.
6 In the model of Acemoglu (2005), risk-taking
by firms increases with aggregate capital accumulation, technical prog-
ress and financial development, so that firm volatility naturally rises with
economic development. Acemoglu stresses that his model can deliver
rising firm volatility accompanied by falling aggregate volatility.
In contrast, Koren and Tenreyro (2006) highlight a mechanism that
generates declines in both aggregate and firm volatility as an economy
develops. In their model, input variety rises naturally with economic
development. As input variety expands, shocks to the productivity of
specific varieties lead to less output volatility, provided that the correla-
tion of variety-specific shocks is imperfect and not rising in the number
of varieties. Koren and Tenreyro argue that this economic mechanism
linking development to input variety helps to explain the negative rela-
tionship between GDP per capita and the volatility of GDP growth rates
across countries and over time within countries. Whether economic
development ultimately dampens firm volatility through the impact of
greater input variety or amplifies it as a result of better opportunities
for financial diversification is obviously an empirical question.
Another line of research stresses the role of competition in goods
markets. Philippon (2003) considers a model with nominal rigidities
that links goods-market competition to firm and aggregate volatility.
In his model, greater competition in the form of a bigger substitution
elasticity among consumption goods magnifies the effects of idiosyn-
cratic shocks on profitability. As a result, greater competition leads to
more firm volatility in sales growth rates and a higher frequency of
price adjustments. In turn, more frequent price adjustments dampen
the response to aggregate demand disturbances in a calibrated ver-
sion of the model. Thus, insofar as aggregate demand shocks drive
aggregate fluctuations, Philippon's model produces divergent trends
in aggregate and firm volatility. Comin and Mulani (2005) argue
that increased R&D-based competition leads to more firm volatility
but weaker comovements and, hence, lower aggregate volatility. As
Acemoglu (2005) points out, however, R&D investments can act toVolatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates 115
increase or decrease competitive intensity, and the link to aggregate
volatility is also tenuous. Comin and Philippon (2005) point to deregu-
lation as a source of greater goods-market competition and rising firm
level volatility. While deregulation is likely to increase firm volatility in
the short term, its longer term impact is less clear. For example, when
regulatory restrictions hamper horizontal consolidation, deregulation
can lead to an industry structure with fewer, larger firms. Horizon-
tal consolidation is, in turn, a force for less firm level volatility. The
removal of regulatory restrictions on branching and interstate banking
accelerated this type of evolutionary pattern in the U.S. banking sector
(Jayaratne and Strahan 1998).
Although much recent work focuses on the potential for better risk-
sharing opportunities or greater goods-market competition to produce
opposite trends in aggregate and firm level volatility, there is a simple
mechanical reason to anticipate that micro and macro volatility will
trend in the same direction. To see the argument, write the firm level
growth rate as a linear function of K aggregate shocks that (potentially)
affect all firms and an idiosyncratic shock, e., that affects only firm i:
(1)
The aggregate growth rate is Z.aity:t, where a{ is firm z's share of aggregate
activity. Assuming mutually uncorrelated shocks, equation (1) implies
the following expressions for firm level and aggregate volatility:
(2)
(3)
n n |~ K
Weighted Mean Firm Volatility = ^ ocita
2el + ^ ait ^
i=l i=l L k=\
n n V K
Aggregate Volatility = X«X + 2X H^l
i i L k=l
In light of the positive comovements that typify aggregate fluctuations,
we assume that the weighted cross-product of the /3 coefficients is posi-
tive for each k.
Inspecting (2) and (3), we see that firm and aggregate volatility
respond in the same direction to a change in any one of the shock vari-
ances, provided that the firm shares a. and the shock response coeffi-
cients Pik are reasonably stable. In particular, a decline in the variability116 Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
of aggregate shocks leads to a decline in both aggregate and firm vola-
tility. Hence, insofar as the well-established secular decline in aggregate
volatility reflects a decline in the size or frequency of aggregate shocks,
we anticipate a decline in average firm volatility as well. Another argu-
ment stresses the importance of idiosyncratic shocks to large firms.
Especially if a is independent of size (a.) at the upper end of the firm
size distribution, as in Gabaix's (2005) granular theory of aggregate fluc-
tuations, trend changes in the idiosyncratic shock variance for, say, the
100 largest firms can be a powerful force that drives micro and macro
volatility in the same direction. Of course, (2) and (3) do not require
that aggregate and firm volatility trend in the same direction. A mix
of positive and negative changes in the shock variances could drive
micro and macro volatility measures in opposite directions, as could
certain changes in the pattern of shock-response coefficients or the firm
size distribution. Still, big trends in the opposite direction for micro and
macro volatility strike us as an unlikely outcome.
Evolutions in market structure can also drive the trend in firm vola-
tility, particularly in sectors that undergo sweeping transformations.
Consider Retail Trade. The expansion of Wal-Mart, Target, Staples, Best
Buy, Home Depot, Borders, and other national chains has propelled
the entry of large retail outlets and displaced thousands of indepen-
dent and smaller retail establishments and firms. Jarmin, Klimek, and
Miranda (2005) report that the share of U.S. retail activity accounted
for by single-establishment firms fell from 60 percent in 1967 to 39 per-
cent in 1997. In its initial phase, this transformation involved high entry
and exit rates, but over time the Retail Trade size distribution shifted
towards larger establishments and much larger firms. Empirical stud-
ies routinely find a strong negative relationship between business size
and volatility. Hence, we anticipate that the transformation of the retail
sector led to a secular decline in the volatility and dispersion of growth
rates among retail businesses.
One other key issue involves the impact of developments that expand
business access to equity markets. Financial developments of this sort
can profoundly alter the mix of publicly traded firms and drive volatil-
ity trends among all listed firms that are unrepresentative of trends for
seasoned listings and the economy as a whole. Some previous studies
point strongly in that direction. For example, Fama and French (2004)
report that the number of new lists (mostly IPOs) on major U.S. stock
markets jumped from 156 per year in 1973-1979 to 549 per year in 1980-
2001. Remarkably, about 10 percent of listed firms are new each yearVolatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates 117
from 1980 to 2001. Fama and French also provide compelling evidence
that new lists are much riskier than seasoned firms and increasingly
so from 1980 to 2001. They conclude that the upsurge of new listings
explains much of the trend increase in idiosyncratic stock return volatil-
ity documented by Campbell et al. (2001). They also suggest that there
was a decline in the cost of equity that allowed weaker firms and those
with more distant payoffs to issue public equity. Fink et al. (2005) pro-
vide additional evidence in support of these conclusions. Drawing on
data from Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001), they report that firm age at
IPO date (measured from its founding date or date of incorporation)
fell dramatically from nearly 40 years old in the early 1960s to less than
five years old by the late 1990s. They find that the positive trend in idio-
syncratic risk is fully explained by the proportion of young firms in the
market. After controlling for age and other measures of firm maturity
(book-to-market, size, profitability), they find a negative trend in idio-
syncratic risk. These studies imply that the selection process govern-
ing entry into the set of publicly traded firms shifted dramatically after
1979, and that the shift continued to intensify through the late 1990s.
3 Data and Measurement
3.1 Source Data: The LBD and COMPUSTAT
The Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) is constructed from the Cen-
sus Bureau's Business Register of U.S. businesses with paid employees
and enhanced with survey data collections. The LBD covers all sectors
of the economy and all geographic areas and currently runs from 1976 to
2001. In recent years, it contains over six million establishment records
and almost five million firm records per year. Basic data items include
employment, payroll, 4-digit SIC, employer identification numbers,
business name, and information about location.
7 Identifiers in the LBD
files enable us to compute growth rate measures for establishments
and firms.
8 Firms in the LBD are defined based on operational control,
and all establishments that are majority owned by the parent firm are
included as part of the parent's activity measures. We restrict attention
in this study to nonfarm businesses in the private sector.
We also exploit COMPUSTAT data from 1950 to 2004.
9 A unit of
observation in COMPUSTAT is a publicly traded security identified
by a CUSIP. We exclude certain CUSIPs because they reflect duplicate
records for a particular firm, multiple security issues for the same firm,118 Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
or because they do not correspond to firms in the usual sense. Duplicate
entries for the same firm (reflecting more than one 10-K filing in the
same year) are few in number but can be quite large (more than 500,000
workers). We also exclude CUSIPs for American Depository Receipts
(ADRs)—securities created by U.S. banks to permit U.S.-based trading
of stocks listed on foreign exchanges. All together, we exclude approxi-
mately 1,100 CUSIPs because of duplicates and ADRs. The presence of
duplicates, ADRs and other features of COMPUSTAT imply the need
for caution in measuring firm outcomes and in linking COMPUSTAT
records to the LBD.
We use COMPUSTAT to supplement the LBD with information
on whether firms are publicly traded. For this purpose, we created a
bridge file that links LBD and COMPUSTAT records based on busi-
ness taxpayer identification numbers (EINs) and business name and
address.
1
0 Missing data on equity prices, sales and employment data for
some COMPUSTAT records do not cause problems for our LBD-based
analysis, because we rely on LBD employment data whether or not the
COMPUSTAT data are missing. Our matching procedures also work
when there are holes in the COMPUSTAT data. In particular, we clas-
sify a firm in the LBD as publicly traded in a given year if it matches to
a COMPUSTAT CUSIP by EIN or name and address, and if the CUSIP
has non-missing equity price data in the same year or in years that
bracket the given year.
Table 2.1 presents LBD and COMPUSTAT summary statistics for
firm counts, employment and firm size in selected years. As of 2000,
the LBD has almost five million firms with positive employment in
the nonfarm private sector, of which we identify more than 7,000 as
publicly traded. Average LBD firm size in 2000 is about 18 employees,
which is tiny compared to the average of 4,000 employees for publicly
traded firms. Publicly traded firms account for a trivial fraction of all
firms and less than one-third of nonfarm business employment during
the period covered by the LBD. The highly skewed nature of the firm
size distribution is also apparent in the enormous difference between
average firm size and the employment-weighted mean firm size (the
coworker mean). For example, the upper panel of table 2.1 reports a
coworker mean of 92,604 employees at publicly traded firms in the LBD
in 2000, roughly 23 times larger than the simple mean of firm size. The
highly skewed nature of the firm size distribution implies the potential
for equally weighted and size-weighted measures of business volatility
and dispersion to behave in dissimilar ways.Table 2.1
Summary Statistics for COMPUSTAT, LBD, and Matched Data Sets
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Notes: In panel A, an LBD firm is identified as publicly traded if it appears in the LBD/COMPUSTAT
Bridge and its COMPUSTAT CUSIP has a positive security price in the indicated year or in years that
bracket the indicated year. In panel B, a COMPUSTAT firm is identified as an LBD match if the CUSIP
appears in the LBD/COMPUSTAT Bridge. In panel B, we do not require the LBD match to have posi-
tive payroll in the current year. In both panels, average employment is the simple mean over firms,
and the coworker mean is the employment-weighted mean firm size.120 Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
Comparisons between the upper and lower panels of table 2.1 require
some care, because the LBD and COMPUSTAT differ in how they define
a firm and in how key variables are measured. LBD employment reflects
the count of workers on the payroll during the pay period covering
the 12
t
h of March. The employment concept is all employees subject to
U.S. payroll taxes. COMPUSTAT employment is the number of com-
pany workers reported to shareholders. It may be an average number
of employees during the year or a year-end figure. More important, it
includes all employees of consolidated subsidiaries, domestic and for-
eign. For this reason, discrepancies between the LBD and COMPUSTAT
are likely to be greater for large multinationals and for foreign firms
with U.S. operations (and listings on U.S. stock exchanges). Since the
source data from annual reports can be incomplete, some COMPUS-
TAT firms have missing employment even when the firm has positive
sales and a positive market value.
With these cautions in mind, consider the lower panel of table 2.1 and
its relationship to the upper panel. The lower panel provides informa-
tion about the match rate in the LBD/COMPUSTAT Bridge. In 1990, for
example, there are 6,239 CUSIPs with positive COMPUSTAT employ-
ment. We match 5,716 of these CUSIPs to firms in the LBD, which
amounts to 92 percent of COMPUSTAT firms with positive employ-
ment and 92 percent of COMPUSTAT employment.
1
1 It is instructive to
compare total employment, average firm size and the coworker mean
between the upper and lower panels of table 2.1 for the bridge cases.
COMPUSTAT figures for these quantities exceed the corresponding
LBD statistics by a very wide margin in all years. For example, among
matched publicly traded firms in the Bridge file, the LBD employment
figure (Panel A) is only 70.8 percent of COMPUSTAT employment
(Panel B) in 1980, 72.2 percent in 1990, and 72.5 percent in 2000. These
large discrepancies for matched cases reflect significant differences in
the LBD and COMPUSTAT employment concepts, e.g., domestic ver-
sus global operations. See the Data Appendix for additional compari-
sons between the two data sources.
We can use the information reported in table 2.1 to construct an esti-
mate for the percentage of nonfarm business employment in publicly
traded firms. First, adjust the COMPUSTAT employment totals for
"Not Matched" cases in Panel B by multiplying by the ratio of LBD-
to-COMPUSTAT employment for matched cases. Second, add the
adjusted COMPUSTAT employment figure for "Not Matched" casesVolatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates 121
to LBD employment for "Publicly Traded (Bridge)" cases in Panel A,
and then divide the sum by LBD nonfarm business employment. The
resulting estimates imply that publicly traded firms account for 32.7
percent of nonfarm business employment in 1980,27.2 percent in 1990,
and 28.6 percent in 2000.
To sum up, the LBD provides data from 1976 to 2001 on the universe
of firms and establishments with at least one employee in the U.S. pri-
vate sector. We identify publicly traded firms in the LBD using our
COMPUSTAT/LBD Bridge. The empirical analysis below focuses on
the LBD, but we also carry out several exercises using COMPUSTAT
data.
3.2 Measuring Firm Growth, Volatility and Cross Sectional
Dispersion
We focus on employment as our activity measure because of its ready
availability in the LBD and COMPUSTAT. Recall from figure 2.1 that
volatility trends for employment and sales growth rates are similar in
COMPUSTAT data. We use a growth rate measure that accommodates








This growth rate measure has become standard in work on labor market
flows, because it offers significant advantages relative to log changes
and growth rates calculated on initial employment. In particular, it
yields measures that are symmetric afbout zero and bounded, affording
an integrated treatment of births, deaths, and continuers. It also lends
itself to consistent aggregation, and it is identical to log changes up to a
second-order Taylor Series expansion. See Tornqvist, Vartia, and Vartia
(1985) and the appendix to Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) for
additional discussion.
To characterize the variability of business outcomes, we consider
several measures of cross sectional dispersion in business growth rates
and volatility in business growth rates. Our basic dispersion measure is
the cross sectional standard deviation of the annual growth rates in (4),
computed in an equal-weighted or size-weighted manner. Our basic
volatility measure follows recent work by Comin and Mulani (2005,122 Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
2006) and Comin and Philippon (2005), among others. They measure
volatility for firm i at t by
1/2
(5)
where /.f is the simple mean growth rate for i from t - 4 to £ + 5.
This measure requires ten consecutive observations on the firm's




Limiting the analysis to firms and establishments with ten consecu-
tive years of positive activity is quite restrictive. Hence, we also con-
sider a modified volatility measure that incorporates entry and exit and
short-lived business units. The modified measure differs from the basic
measure in two main respects. First, we weight the squared deviation
at t for firm i in proportion to its size at t relative to its average size in
the ten-year window from t - 4 to t + 5. Second, we apply a standard
degrees-of-freedom correction to avoid the small-sample bias that oth-
erwise arises for second moment estimates.
1
3 We ignored this issue in
the basic volatility measure, following standard practice, because the
correction is the same for all firms and would simply scale up the vola-
tility magnitude by (10/9). However, the correction matters when some
firms have much shorter intervals of positive activity than others. The
degrees-of-freedom correction also enables us to obtain unbiased esti-
mates for average volatility near the LBD and COMPUSTAT sample
end points, which truncate the available window for estimating firm
level volatility.
Here are the details for constructing our modified volatility measure.
Let zjt = 3(xjt + xjtl) denote the size of firm i at time t, and let Pit denote
the number of years from t - 4 to t + 5 for which zjt > 0. Define the scal-
ing quantity,
and the rescaled weights, zit = K.tzit. By construction,
The modified firm volatility measure with degrees-of-freedom correc-






wit is firm /'s size-weighted mean growth rate from t - 4 to t + 5,
using the zit as weights. We construct this measure for all businesses in
year t with a positive value for z.f In other words, we compute (6) on
the same set of firms as the contemporaneous dispersion measure.
The average magnitude of firm volatility at a point in time can be cal-
culated using equal weights or weights proportional to business size.
We prefer size-weighted volatility (and dispersion) measures for most
purposes, but we also report some equal-weighted measures for com-
parison to previous work. In the size-weighted measures, the weight
for business i at t is proportional to zit.
Summing up, our dispersion measures reflect year-to-year, between-
firm variation in growth rates. Our volatility measures reflect year-to-
year, within-firm variation in growth rates. Some volatility measures
restrict analysis to long-lived firms, but we also consider modified
volatility measures defined over the same firms as contemporaneous
dispersion measures. Volatility and dispersion measures have differ-
ent properties, and they highlight different aspects of business growth
rate behavior. Still, they are closely related concepts. For example, if
business growth rates are drawn from stochastic processes with con-
temporaneously correlated movements in second moments, then the
cross-sectional dispersion in business growth rates and the average vol-




3.3 Firm Volatility—Robustness to the Bridge Cases
To assess whether our results are sensitive to the use of publicly traded
firms in the LBD/COMPUSTAT Bridge, we compare firm volatility for
the full COMPUSTAT to firm volatility for matched cases. We consider
all CUSIPs that match to the LBD in any year during the LBD overlap
from 1976 to 2001. Figure 2.3 displays the comparison. It shows that
restricting attention to those publicly traded firms that we identify in
the LBD/COMPUSTAT Bridge has no material effect on the volatility
results. This result gives us confidence that our LBD-based compari-
sons below of publicly traded and privately held firms are not distorted
by inadequacies in our matching algorithm.124 Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
Average Volatility of Firm Employment Growth Rates:






Source: Own calculations on COMPUSTAT data and COMPUSTAT-LBD Bridge file.
Notes: Calculations exclude COMPUSAT entry and exit. Firm volatility calculated
according to equation (5).
Figure 2.3
Full COMPUSTAT Compared to COMPUSTAT-LBD Bridge File
4 Business Volatility and Dispersion Trends
4.1 Results Using COMPUSTAT Data on Publicly Traded Firms
We now compare the volatility and dispersion in business growth rates
using COMPUSTAT data. At this point, we do not restrict attention to
firms in the Bridge file.
1
5 Figure 2.4 shows the now-familiar pattern
of rising firm volatility overlaid against a similar trend for the cross
sectional dispersion of firm growth rates. To ensure an apples-to-
apples comparison, we calculate dispersion using only those firm-year
observations for which we calculate firm volatility. While the vola-
tility and dispersion measures capture different aspects of business
dynamics, figure 2.4 shows that they closely track each other over the
longer term. Similar results obtain for sales-based volatility and disper-
sion measures and for dispersion measures calculated on all firm-year
observations. However, dispersion is uniformly larger than aver-
age firm volatility. That is, between-firm variation in annual growthVolatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates 125













• Firm Level Volatility - - - - Cross Sectional Dispersion (right axis)











-Rrm Level Volatility - - - -Cross Sectional Dispersion (rightaxis)
Source: Own calculations on COMPUSTAT data.
Notes: Calculations exclude COMPUSTAT entry and exit. Firm volatility calculated according to
equation (5).
Figure 2.4
Firm Volatility and Dispersion of Employment Growth Rates Compared, COMPUSTAT
Data
rates exceeds the average within-firm variation. The gap between the
dispersion and volatility measures shown in figure 2.4 expanded over
time from about 4 percentage points in 1955 to 7 percentage points in
1999.
Figure 2.4 also shows that weighted measures are considerably
smaller than the corresponding unweighted measures at all times. This
pattern reflects the greater stability of growth rates at larger firms. The
weighted measures also show a smaller and less steady upward trend
than the unweighted measures, as we saw in figure 2.1. The rest of the
paper reports weighted measures of dispersion and volatility, because
we think they are more relevant for aggregate behavior. Moreover, on126 Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
an unweighted basis, publicly traded firms have negligible effects on
dispersion and volatility measures for the private sector as a whole,
because they are so few in number.
4.2 Results Using Firm Level Data in the Longitudinal Business
Database
A concern with COMPUSTAT-based results is whether they generalize
to the entire economy. Figure 2.5 exploits LBD data to address this con-
cern.
1
6 The figure shows large declines in the volatility and dispersion
of firm growth rates for the whole nonfarm private sector and even
larger declines among privately held firms. The dispersion in growth
rates falls by about 13 percentage points from 1978 to 2000 in the pri-
vate sector and by about 20 percentage points among privately held
firms.
1
7 The average magnitude of firm volatility falls by about 10 per-
centage points from 1981 to 1996 in the private sector and by about 17
percentage points among privately held firms. The volatility decline in
the private sector over this period is more than 40 percent of its 1981
value, a striking contrast to the rise in volatility among publicly traded
firms over the same period.
The LBD-based results also show that privately held firms are much
more volatile than publicly traded firms, and their growth rates show
much greater dispersion. This pattern is not particularly surpris-
ing, because a bigger share of activity in the publicly traded sector is
accounted for by older and larger firms that tend to be relatively stable.
As figure 2.5 shows, however, publicly traded and privately held firms
are converging in terms of the volatility and dispersion of their growth
rates. We return to this matter shortly.
The finding that firm volatility in the private sector falls over time
is consistent with previous findings in the job flows literature (figure
2.2). It is also consistent with previous research using the LBD. One of
the earliest findings from the LBD is a steady decline in establishment
entry rates (Foster (2003) and Jarmin, Klimek, and Miranda (2003)).
Recent work also finds declining entry and exit rates in local retail mar-
kets for establishments and firms (Jarmin, Klimek, and Miranda 2005).
Jarmin et al. stress the changing structure of retail trade as one factor
underlying the decline in entry and exit. They document the increas-
ing share of activity accounted for by large, national retail chains with
many establishments.
1
8 This change in industry structure has a power-Volatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates 127
Employment-Weighted Dispersion of Firm Growth Rates,
Three-Year Moving Averages
0.15
1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001
Year
Total Privately Held Publicly Traded
Employment-Weighted Volatility of Firm Growth Rates
Year
- Total Economy Privately Held • Publicly Traded
Source: Own calculations on LBD data.
Notes: Calculations in the top panel include entry and exit. Firm volatility in the bottom
panel is calculated according to equation (5) and, hence, excludes short-lived firms.
Figure 2.5
Dispersion and Volatility of Employment Growth Rates by Ownership Status, LBD Data128 Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
ful effect, because entry and exit rates are substantially higher for small,
single-unit firms than for large national chains. We return to the role of
industry structure and business turnover in section 5.
All volatility series displayed thus far are based on equation (5) and
limited to firms with at least ten consecutive observations. This selec-
tion criterion is especially restrictive for privately held firms, most of
which do not survive ten years. By and large, privately held firms are
relatively volatile, and so are short-lived firms. If the objective is to
examine the overall magnitude of firm volatility, then it is desirable
to use datasets and statistics that capture the most volatile units in the
economy. To do so, we now use LBD data to calculate modified volatil-
ity measures based on equation (6). Figure 2.6 shows the results for the
employment-weighted modified volatility measure. As before, volatil-
ity is higher and falling for privately held business, lower and rising
for publicly traded firms. Modified volatility for privately held firms
falls from 0.60 in 1977 to 0.42 in 2001, with the entire fall occurring after
1987. Modified volatility for publicly traded firms rises from 0.16 in
1977 to 0.29 in 1999.
4.3 Volatility Convergence across Major Industry Groups
The most striking features of figures 2.5 and 2.6 are the opposite
trends for publicly traded and privately held firms and the dramatic
convergence in their volatility levels. Table 2.2 shows that these two
features hold in every major industry group. Among publicly traded
firms, modified volatility rises for all industry groups, though by
widely varying amounts. The biggest volatility gains among publicly
traded firms occur in Transportation and Public Utilities, Wholesale,
FIRE, and Services. Among privately held firms, the modified volatility
measure declines by 23 percent for FIRE and by 30 percent or more for
all other industry groups. Overall volatility in the nonfarm business
sector declines for every industry group, with drops of more than 30
percent in Construction, Wholesale, Retail, and Services. The volatil-
ity convergence phenomenon is also present in every industry group.
Between 1978 and 2001, the ratio of volatility among privately held
firms to volatility among publicly traded firms fell from 3.2 to 1.7 in
Manufacturing, from 6.3 to 1.8 in Transportation and Public Utilities,
from 4.2 to 2.2 in Retail, from 3.3 to 1.3 in FIRE, and from 2.3 to 1.1 in













- Total Economy Privately Held —— Publicly Traded]
Source: Own calculations on LBD data.
Notes: Calculations include entry and exit and short-lived firms. Firm volatility calcu-
lated according to equation (6).
Figure 2.6
Modified Measure of Volatility in Firm Growth Rates, 1977-2001, LBD Data
5 Exploring and Refining the Main Results
5.1 Establishment-Based Measures
Trends in the volatility and dispersion of establishment growth rates
can differ from trends for firm growth rates. In particular, a shift over
time towards multi-unit firms yields declines in the volatility and dis-
persion of firm growth rates through a simple statistical aggregation
effect. If two establishments with imperfectly correlated growth rates
combine into a single firm, for example, then the volatility of the firm's
growth rates is lower than the average volatility for the two establish-
ments. As mentioned earlier, the Retail Trade sector has undergone a
pronounced shift away from single-unit firms to national chains. Moti-
vated by these observations, figure 2.7 shows the employment-weighted
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Employment-Weighted Dispersion of Establishment
Growth Rates, Three-Year Moving Averages
1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001
Year








Total Economy Privately Held Publicly Traded
Source: Own calculations on LBD data.
Notes: Calculations include entry and exit and short-lived establishments. Modified
establishment volatility calculated according to equation (6).
Figure 2.7
Dispersion and Volatility of Establishment Growth Rates, LBD Data132 Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
LBD data. Publicly traded establishments are those owned by publicly
traded firms. In line with the statistical aggregation effect, the levels of
volatility and dispersion are substantially higher for publicly traded
establishments than for publicly traded firms.
As seen in figure 2.7, the basic patterns for establishment-based mea-
sures are the same as for firm-based measures. Dispersion and volatil-
ity fall for the privately held, and they rise for the publicly traded. As
before, the overall trend for the nonfarm business sector is dominated
by privately held businesses. Some differences between the firm-based
and establishment-based results are also apparent. Rather remarkably,
there is full volatility convergence between publicly traded and pri-
vately held establishments by the end of the LBD sample period. In
sum, figure 2.7 shows that our main results are not sensitive to the dis-
tinction between firms and establishments.
5.2 The Role of Entry and Exit
Figure 2.8 shows the dispersion and volatility of employment growth
rates for continuing firms only. We calculate these measures on an
employment-weighted basis from LBD data, after excluding entry-year
and exit-year observations at the firm level. The exclusion of entry and
exit mutes the downward trends for privately held firms and for the
nonfarm sector as a whole. Indeed, the modified volatility measure for
the nonfarm business sector is essentially flat from 1977 to 2001 when
we restrict attention to continuers. This sample restriction also mutes
the rise in volatility and dispersion for publicly traded firms. Not sur-
prisingly, the levels of volatility and dispersion are also much lower
when we exclude entry and exit. A comparison of figures 2.5 and 2.8
reveals, for example, that the exclusion of entry and exit lowers the
overall dispersion of firm growth rates by about one third.
Figure 2.9 provides direct evidence on the magnitude of entry
and exit by ownership status for firms and establishments. The fig-
ure shows three-year moving averages of the employment-weighted
sum of entry and exit, expressed as a percentage of employment. As
seen in the figure, the volatility convergence phenomenon also holds
for entry and exit rates, whether calculated for establishments or
firms. Among privately held businesses, the sum of establishment
entry and exit rates declines from 20.6 to 12.9 percent of employment
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Figure 2.8
Dispersion and Volatility of Firm Growth Rates, Continuers Only, LBD Data134 Davis, Haiti wanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
Sum of Business Entry and Exit Rates,
Publicly Traded versus Privately Held
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Firm(private) -*— Firm(public) -a— Est(private) -*— Est(public)
Source: Own calculations on LBD data.
Note: The employment-weighted sum of entry and exit rates at / is expressed as a
percentage of the simple average of employment in /-land /.
Figure 2.9
Employment-Weighted Sum of Entry and Exit Rates for Establishments and Firms by
Ownership Status, Three-Year Moving Averages
employment for publicly traded. Thus, there is essentially full volatil-
ity convergence by 2001 for establishment-based measures of business
turnover.
On average, each publicly traded firm operates about 90 establish-
ments, which implies considerable scope for statistical aggregation.
This effect shows up in figure 2.9 as a large gap between firm-based
and establishment-based turnover among publicly traded businesses.
In contrast, there are only 1.16 establishments per privately held firm,
which implies much less scope for statistical aggregation. Indeed, the
sum of entry and exit rates for privately held firms exceeds the corre-
sponding establishment-based measure in the early years of the LBD.
This feature of figure 2.9 indicates that a portion of the firm entry and
exit events identified in the LBD reflects ownership changes for con-
tinuing businesses, rather than complete firm shutdowns or de novo
entry.
1
9 Since the gap between firm-based and establishment-based
turnover narrows rapidly in the early years of the LBD, figure 2.9 also
suggests that we overstate the decline in firm-based measures of disper-
sion and volatility in the first few years.
2
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observations give confidence that our main findings about volatility
and dispersion trends and volatility convergence are not driven by
ownership changes. First, the firm-establishment turnover gap is close
to zero after 1984 (figure 2.9). Second, the basic trends and volatility
convergence results hold up strongly when we consider establishment-
based measures (figure 2.7). Third, our main results also hold when we
restrict attention to continuing firms, which exclude improperly broken
longitudinal links by construction (figure 2.8).
2
1
5.3 The Role of Size, Age, and Industry Composition
We now investigate whether shifts in the size, age, and industry com-
position of employment can account for the trends in firm volatility and
dispersion. Shifts in the employment distribution along these dimen-
sions have potentially large effects, because volatility and dispersion
magnitudes vary by industry and especially by business size and age.
2
2
To investigate this issue, table 2.3 reports modified volatility measures
in 1982 and 2001 alongside the volatility values implied by fixing the
industry, age, and/or size distribution of employment at 1982 shares
while allowing category-specific volatilities to vary over time as in the
data. We employ a cell-based shift-share methodology, where we com-
pute the modified volatility measure for 448 size, age, and industry
cells per year. We use 1982 employment shares, because it is the earliest
year for which we can identify seven distinct age categories in the LBD
data—entrants, 1,2, 3,4, 5, and 6+ years of age, where firm age is iden-
tified as the age of the firm's oldest establishment. In addition to seven
age categories, we consider eight size categories and the eight industry
groups listed in table 2.2.
Table 2.3 contains several noteworthy findings. Turning first to pub-
licly traded firms, modified volatility rises by 21 percent from 0.21 in
1982 to 0.26 in 2001. The volatility rise among publicly traded firms
is essentially unchanged when we control for shifts in the size and
age distribution of employment. In contrast, when we fix the industry
employment distribution at 1982 shares, the volatility rise among pub-
licly traded firms is cut by half. To shed additional light on this result,
figure 2.10 shows the evolution of selected industry shares among pub-
licly traded firms over the period covered by the LBD. The manufactur-
ing employment share fell from almost 50 percent in the late 1970s to 23
percent in 2001, while the shares accounted for by FIRE, Services, and
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Employment Shares among Publicly Traded Firms,
Selected Industries
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Manufacturing Retail Trade FIRE Services
Source: Own calculations using LBD data and COMPUSTAT/LBD Bridge.
Figure 2.10
Industry Employment Shares among Publicly Traded Firms, 1976-2001
Manufacturing and Retail firms is about one-fifth lower than overall
volatility for publicly traded firms in 2001. In contrast, volatility among
publicly traded firms in FIRE and Services is considerably greater. Thus,
the large contribution of industry composition changes to the volatility
rise among publicly traded firms is basically a story of shifts from Man-
ufacturing to FIRE and Services. The coincident shift to Retail actually
muted the rise in volatility among publicly traded firms.
Turning next to privately held firms, table 2.3 reports that volatility
fell by 31 percent from 0.60 in 1982 to 0.42 in 2001. In contrast to the
story for publicly traded firms, shifts in the industry distribution play
essentially no role in the volatility trend for privately held firms. Size
effects play a rather modest role. However, when we fix the age distri-
bution of employment at 1982 shares, the volatility drop among pri-
vately held firms is cut by 27 percent. This 27 percent figure probably
understates the contribution of shifts in the age distribution, because
we cannot finely differentiate age among older firms in the early years
covered by the LBD.
Table 2.4 provides additional information about the role of shifts in
the age distribution among privately held firms. The table confirms138 Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
Table 2.4
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Source: Own calculations on LBD data.
Notes: Modified firm volatility measures calculated according to equation (6). Average
volatility across firms computed on an employment-weighted basis.
that volatility declines steeply with firm age. Note, also, that the share
of employment in firms at least six years old increases from 75.6 per-
cent in 1982 to 83.6 percent in 2001, and that volatility drops much
more sharply in the six+ category than any other age category. More-
over, average volatility by age among privately held firms continues
to decline through 25 years of age in 2001, as reported in the lower
part of table 2.4. These results are highly suggestive of unmeasured
shifts from 1982 to 2001 in the age distribution of employment toward
older, less volatile firms within the six+ category. Hence, we conclude
that shifts in the age distribution of employment among privately held
firms probably account for more than the 27 percent figure suggested
by table 2.3.
2
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Turning last to the results for all firms, table 2.3 implies that shifts
in the age distribution of employment account for 29 percent of the
volatility decline. Size effects alone account for 10 percent of the over-
all volatility decline. In unreported results that use a finer size break-
down, we find that a shift toward larger firms accounts for 25 percent
of the volatility decline in Retail Trade.
2
4 These results are related to
the decline in the employment-weighted entry and exit rates among
privately held firms, documented in figure 2.9. Since older and larger
firms have lower exit rates, a shift of employment toward these firms
leads to lower rates of firm turnover. Lastly, table 2.3 implies that shifts
in the industry mix of employment actually work against the overall
volatility decline among nonfarm businesses.
5.3 Why the Rise in Volatility among Publicly Traded Firms?
As discussed in section 2, there was a large upsurge in the number
of newly listed firms after 1979. Fama and French (2004), among oth-
ers, provide evidence that new listings are riskier than seasoned pub-
lic firms, and that they became increasingly risky relative to seasoned
firms after 1979. These pieces of evidence point to a significant change
in the economic selection process governing entry into the set of pub-
licly traded firms. They also suggest that much of the volatility and
dispersion rise among publicly traded firms reflects a large influx of
more volatile firms in later cohorts.
We now investigate this issue, focusing on the modified volatility
concept for publicly traded firms. We rely on COMPUSTAT for this pur-
pose, because it spans a much longer period than the LBD. The scope
of COMPUSTAT expanded in certain years during our sample period,
e.g., NASDAQ listings first became available as part of COMPUSTAT
in 1973. Since COMPUSTAT does not accurately identify first listing
year for firms that are added to COMPUSTAT because of changes in
scope, we drop such firms from the data set for the present analysis.
2
5
As before, we intentionally exclude entry-year and exit-year observa-
tions in the COMPUSTAT data because listing and delisting typically
do not reflect the birth or shutdown of the firm.
Figure 2.11 plots modified volatility time series for ten-year entry
cohorts, defined by time of first listing. Volatility appears to be some-
what higher for the 1960s and 1970s cohort than earlier cohorts, and it is
much higher still for the 1980s and 1990s cohorts.
2
6 To help understand
how these cohort effects influence the evolution of overall volatility140 Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
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Source: Own calculations on COMPUSTAT data.
Notes: Calculations exclude entry and exit. Firm volatility calculated according to
equation (6). Average volatility computed on an employment-weighted basis.
Figure 2.11
Modified Volatility by Cohort among Publicly Traded Firms
among publicly traded firms, figure 2.12 displays cohort employment
shares over the period covered by COMPUSTAT. This figure shows that
cohort employment shares initially grow quite rapidly, and that this
effect is especially strong for the 1990s cohort. By the latter part of the
1990s, firms that first listed in the 1980s or 1990s account for about 40
percent of employment among publicly traded firms. Taken together,
figures 2.11 and 2.12 suggest that cohort effects play a powerful role in
the volatility rise among publicly traded firms.
Figure 2.13 quantifies the contribution of cohort effects to the evolu-
tion of volatility among publicly traded firms. For the sake of compari-
son, the figure also provides information about the contribution of size,
age, and industry effects. To construct figure 2.13, we first fit employ-
ment-weighted regressions of firm volatility on year effects and other
variables using COMPUSTAT data from 1951 to 2004. Our basic spec-
ification regresses firm volatility on year effects only. The fitted yearVolatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates 141
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Source: Own calculations on COMPUSTAT data.
Figure 2.12
Employment Shares by Cohort, Publicly Traded Firms
effects in this basic specification yield the "No Controls" series plotted
in figure 2.13. Next, we expand the basic specification to include indica-
tors for one-year entry cohorts. The fitted year effects in this expanded
specification yield the "Cohort" series plotted in figure 2.13. To isolate
the impact of size, we expand the basic specification to include a quartic
in log employment, which yields the "Size" series. Finally, we add the
quartic in size, 1-digit industry controls and simple age controls (less
than five years and five+ years since listing) to the basic specification to
obtain the "Size, Age, and Industry" series in figure 2.13.
The results in figure 2.13 provide a powerful and simple explana-
tion for the trend volatility rise among publicly traded firms. Accord-
ing to the figure, neither size effects alone nor the combination of size,
age, and industry effects account for much of the volatility rise.
2
7 In
sharp contrast, simple cohort controls absorb most of the volatility rise
for publicly traded firms. Table 2.5 quantifies this point by comparing142 Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
Modified Volatility among Publicly Traded Firms:
The Role of Size, Age, Industry and Cohort Effects
v v v v v v v v v v v V v v 'f
No Controls —&— Size —*— Size, Age & Industry Cohort
Source: Own calculations on COMPUSTAT data.
Notes: Calculations exclude entry and exit. Firm volatility calculated according to
equation (6). Average volatility computed on an employment-weighted basis.
Figure 2.13
The Role of Size, Age, Industry and Cohort Effects for Publicly Trade Firms
the longer term change in fitted year effects with and without cohort
controls. From 1978 to 1999, for example, the controls for entry cohort
absorb 64 percent of the volatility rise among publicly traded firms.
Over the 1978 to 2004 period, the trend change in volatility among pub-
licly traded firms is actually negative once we control for entry cohort.
In unreported results using LBD data, we find even stronger results—
controls for entry cohort absorb 85 percent of the volatility rise among
publicly traded firms from 1977 to 2001.
6 Concluding Remarks
Comprehensive micro data reveal that volatility and cross sectional
dispersion in business growth rates declined in recent decades. Our
preferred measure of firm volatility in employment growth rates (fig-
ure 2.6) fell 23 percent from 1978 to 2001 and 29 percent from 1987 to
2001. Our most remarkable finding, however, is a striking difference in
volatility and dispersion trends by business ownership status. AmongVolatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates 143
Table 2.5

































Source: Own calculations on COMPUSTAT data.
Notes: "Initial Volatility" reports estimated year effects in a weighted least squares
regression of modified volatility on year dummies, with weights proportional to firm
size (z ). The data set consists of an unbalanced panel of firm level observations from
1951 to 2004. "Change in Volatility" reports the change in the estimated year effects (Ay)
from the same regression. To quantify the percentage of the volatility change accounted
for by cohort effects, we expand the regression to include one-year cohort dummies (year
of first listing) and calculate the change in estimated year effects with cohort controls
(Ay
cc). Lastly, we calculate the "Percentage of Volatility Change Accounted for by Cohort
Effects" as 100(Ay - Ay
cc)/Ay.
privately held firms, volatility is relatively high but it fell by one-third
from 1978 to 2001. Among publicly traded firms, volatility is lower but
it rose by three-quarters from 1978 to 1999. This pattern of volatility
convergence between publicly traded and privately held businesses
prevails for every major industry group.
Our study also provides some proximate explanations for these
strong patterns in the data. Employment shifts toward older businesses
account for 27 percent or more of the volatility decline among privately
held firms. In addition, shifts toward larger businesses played a role
in certain industries, particularly Retail Trade. In line with the shifts
toward older and larger businesses, the employment-weighted busi-
ness turnover rate declined markedly after 1978. Finally, simple cohort
effects that capture higher volatility among more recently listed firms
account for most of the volatility rise among publicly traded firms.
These empirical results suggest a number of interesting questions and
directions for future research. Consider, first, the connection between
employer volatility and unemployment. Employer volatility can be
interpreted as a rough proxy for the intensity of idiosyncratic shocks,
a key parameter in unemployment models that stress search and144 Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
matching frictions. A lower intensity of idiosyncratic shocks in these
models leads to less job loss, fewer workers flowing through the unem-
ployment pool, and less frictional unemployment. Motivated by these
models, figure 2.14 plots our employment-weighted modified volatility
measure against annual averages of monthly unemployment inflow and
outflow rates. The figure suggests that secular declines in the intensity
of idiosyncratic shocks contributed to large declines in unemployment
flows and frictional unemployment in recent decades. More study is
clearly needed to confirm or disconfirm this view, and there is surely a
role for other factors such as the aging of the workforce after 1980.
Another major development in U.S. labor markets since the early
1980s is a large rise in wage and earnings inequality.
2
8 One line of inter-
pretation for this development stresses potential sources of increased
wage and earnings flexibility: declines in the real minimum wage, a
diminished role for private sector unionism and collective bargaining,
intensified competitive pressures that undermined rigid compensation
structures, the growth of employee leasing and temp workers, and the
Firm Volatility and Unemployment Flows
I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (- 0.35
- Unemployment Inflow —•— Unemployment Outflow
-Volatility (Right axis)
Source: Figure 6 for volatility measure and the Current Population Survey.
Notes: Unemployment flows are annual averages of monthly flows, expressed as a per-
centage of the labor force.
Figure 2.14
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erosion of norms that had previously restrained wage differentials and
prevented wage cuts. Greater wage (and hours) flexibility can produce
smaller firm level employment responses to idiosyncratic shocks and
smaller aggregate employment responses to common shocks. So, in
principle, greater wage flexibility can provide a unified explanation for
the rise in wage and earnings inequality and the declines in aggregate
volatility, firm volatility and unemployment flows. We mention the role
of wage flexibility because we think it merits investigation and may be
a significant part of the story, not because we believe that greater wage
flexibility or any single factor can explain all aspects of longer term
developments in wage inequality, unemployment, firm volatility, and
aggregate volatility.
The potential role of greater wage flexibility is related to another
question raised by our results. In particular, to what extent do trends
in firm volatility reflect a change in the size and frequency of shocks,
and to what extent do they reflect a change in shock response dynam-
ics? One simple approach to this question is to fit statistical models that
allow for nonstationarity in the size and frequency of business level
innovations and in the response dynamics to the innovations. Another
approach is to identify specific shocks, quantify their magnitude, and
investigate whether shock magnitudes and firm level responses to them
have changed over time.
Several pieces of evidence point to a major shift in the selection pro-
cess governing entry into the set of publicly traded firms. Figure 2.13
and table 2.5 above indicate that more than half of the volatility rise
among publicly traded firms in recent decades reflects an influx of more
volatile firms in later cohorts. Other researchers find that later cohorts
of publicly traded firms are riskier in terms of equity return variabil-
ity, profit variability, time from IPO to profitability, and business age at
time of first listing. The shift in the selection process for publicly traded
firms is a major phenomenon, in our view, but it does not by itself
explain the volatility convergence pattern we have documented or the
overall downward trend in firm volatility and dispersion. To appreci-
ate this point, consider a simple selection story that we sketch with the
aid of figure 2.15. The figure shows a hypothetical density function for
firm level risk and a risk threshold that separates publicly traded from
privately held firms. This figure captures, in a highly stylized man-
ner, the notion that publicly traded firms are less risky than privately
held ones. Suppose that the risk threshold moves to the right, so that
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average risk among publicly traded firms, but it also produces an
increase in average risk among privately held firms and in the share of
activity accounted for by publicly traded firms. The latter two implica-
tions are at odds with the evidence, at least when risk is measured by
firm volatility and activity is measured by employment.
A richer story, with changing selection as one key element, is more
consistent with the evidence. As discussed in Section 2, smaller aggre-
gate shocks can readily explain declines in macro volatility and the
overall magnitude of firm volatility. In combination with a changing
selection process, smaller aggregate shocks can rationalize the volatility
convergence pattern we document and the declines in aggregate and
average firm volatility. A shift of activity toward older and larger firms
may have contributed to changes in the way firms respond to shocks.
Shifts in the industry mix away from manufacturing and other indus-
tries that traditionally accounted for a large share of publicly traded
firms help to explain why the share of employment in publicly traded
firms has not risen.
Finally, our results also present something of a challenge to Schum-
peterian theories of growth and development. In particular, the sizableVolatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates 147
decline in average firm volatility that we document coincided with a
period of impressive productivity gains for the U.S. economy. This coin-
cidence belies any close and simple positive relationship between pro-
ductivity growth and the intensity of the creative destruction process,
at least as measured by firm-based or establishment-based measures of
volatility in employment growth rates. Perhaps there has been a large
increase in the pace of restructuring, experimentation, and adjustment
activities within firms. Another possibility is that a more intense cre-
ative destruction process among publicly traded firms, partly facilitated
by easier access to public equity by high-risk firms, has been sufficient
to generate the commercial innovations that fueled rapid productivity
gains throughout the economy.
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Endnotes
1. The LBD is confidential under Titles 13 & 26 U.S.C. Research access to the LBD can
be granted to non-Census staff for approved projects. See www.ces.census.gov for more
information. COMPUSTAT, which provides information on publicly traded firms only,
has been the primary data source for recent work on firm level volatility.
2. Firm level volatility is calculated from COMPUSTAT data as a moving ten-year win-
dow on the standard deviation of firm level growth rates. See equation (5) in section 3.
3. Excess job reallocation equals the sum of gross job creation and destruction less the
absolute value of net employment growth. Dividing excess reallocation by the level of
employment yields a rate. One can show that the excess reallocation rate is equivalent to
the employment-weighted mean absolute deviation of establishment growth rates about
zero. See Davis, Haitiwanger, and Schuh (1996).
4. Job flow statistics for the whole private sector are from the BLS Business Employment
Dynamics. They are unavailable prior to 1990.148 Davis, Haitiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
5. Acemoglu (2005), Eberly (2005), and Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006) question
whether sample selection colors the findings in previous studies of firm level volatility.
6. French stock market reforms in the 1980s considerably broadened the shareholder
base for French firms. Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) provide evidence that these reforms
led to a rise in the volatility of sales growth rates among listed firms relative to unlisted
ones. Their analysis sample contains about 5,600 French firms per year with more than
500 employees or 30 million Euros in annual sales, and that were never owned, entirely
or in part, by the French state.
7. Sales data are available in the LBD from 1994. Sales data from the Economic Censuses
are available every five years for earlier years. More recent years in the LBD record indus-
try on a NAICS basis.
8. See the data appendix regarding the construction of longitudinal links, which are criti-
cal for our analysis.
9. Our COMPUSTAT data are from the same provider (WRDS) as in recent work by
Comin and Mulani (2006), Comin and Philippon (2005), and others.
10. See McCue and Jarmin (2005) for details. We extend their methodology to include the
whole period covered by the LBD.
11. If we require that matches have positive COMPUSTAT employment and positive LBD
employment in 1990, then the number of matched CUSIPs drops from 5,716 to 5,035.
However, this requirement is overly restrictive in light of our previous remarks about
missing COMPUSTAT employment observations, the inclusion of employment from for-
eign operations in COMPUSTAT, and timing differences between COMPUSTAT and the
LBD. For instance, when we relax this requirement and instead allow CUSIPs with posi-
tive sales, price or employment to match to LBD firms with positive employment, then
the number of matches exceeds 5,700.
12. When we implement (5) using LBD data, we permit the firm to enter or exit at the
beginning or end of the ten-year window. This is a small difference in measurement pro-
cedures relative to Comin and Mulani (2005, 2006) and Comin and Philippon (2005). A
more important difference is that our LBD-based calculations include the pre-public and
post-public history of firms that are publicly traded at t but privately held before or after
t. As a related point, we do not treat listing and de-listing in COMPUSTAT as firm entry
and exit.
13. We thank Eva Nagypal for drawing our attention to this issue.
14. The shorter term response differs, however, as have verified in unreported numerical
simulations. For example, a one-time permanent increase in the variance of the distribu-
tion of idiosyncratic shocks leads to a coincident permanent increase in the cross sectional
dispersion of business growth rates, but it leads to a gradual rise in the average volatility
that begins several years prior to the increase in the shock variance and continues for
several years afterward.
15. But we do exclude observations with growth rates of 2 and -2, because COMPUSTAT
listing and de-listing typically do not reflect true entry and exit by firms. In the LBD-
based analysis below, we include observations with growth rates of 2 and -2 (unless
otherwise noted), because we can identify true entry and exit in the LBD.
16. A comparison between figures 2.4 and 2.5 reveals that the level of volatility among
publicly traded firms is much greater in COMPUSTAT, perhaps because COMPUSTAT
activity measures include the foreign operations of multinational firms.Volatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates 149
17. Recall that we use all firm-year observations with positive values of zjt when comput-
ing our basic dispersion measure. That is, we include all continuing, entering and exiting
firms. Below, we consider the effects of restricting the analysis to continuing firms only.
18. Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2005) present related evidence using the Census
of Retail Trade. They show that much of the increase in labor productivity in the 1990s
in retail trade reflects the entry of relatively productive establishments owned by large
national chains and the exit of less productive establishments owned by single-unit firms.
See, also, McKinsey Global Institute (2001).
19. While ownership changes can affect firm level longitudinal linkages in the LBD, they
do not affect establishment level linkages. See the Data appendix for more discussion of
linkage issues.
20. While not a trivial task, we can use the LBD to separately identify and measure firm
ownership change, de novo entry and complete firm shutdown. In future work, we plan
to explore this decomposition.
21. See the Data Appendix for details about the firm and establishment concepts used in
the LBD and the construction of longitudinal links.
22. There is a vast literature on the relationship of business entry, exit, and growth rates
to business size and age. See Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989), Sutton (1997), Caves
(1998), Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), and Davis et al. (2005) for evidence, analysis, and
extensive references to related research.
23. The precise contribution of shifts in the age distribution to the volatility decline
among privately held firms depends on exactly how we carry out the decomposition.
Table 2.3, which evaluates volatilities at the 1982 age distribution, implies that the age dis-
tribution shift accounts for 27 percent of the volatility drop from 1982 to 2001. Table 2.4,
which evaluates volatilities at the 2001 age distribution, reports that the age distribution
shift accounts for 19.6 percent of the volatility drop. Both exercises are likely to understate
the impact of shifts toward older privately held firms for reasons discussed in the text.
24. The finer size classification breaks the 1,000+ category into 1000-2499, 2500-4999,
5000-9999, and 10,000+ categories.
25. In unreported results, this sample selection requirement has little impact on the over-
all volatility trend in COMPUSTAT, but it does have an impact on the volatility trends
for certain cohorts.
26. The modified volatility series in figure 2.11 are employment weighted. We suppress
the 1953 and 1954 values for the 1950s cohort, because they are calculated from only
one or two firm level observations. In unreported results, the equal-weighted modified
volatility series show a stronger pattern of greater volatility for later cohorts. So does the
employment-weighted basic volatility measure.
27. Industry effects play a substantially larger role in table 2.3 (LBD data) than in figure
2.13 (COMPUSTAT data). Unreported results show that much of the difference arises
because of different sample periods. In particular, regardless of data set and whether we
use a shift-share or regression-based method, industry effects play a substantially larger
role from 1982 to 2001 than from 1977 to 2001. Differences between table 2.3 and figure
2.13 in method and data set play a smaller role.
28. See Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005) for a recent contribution to this literature, a
review of major competing hypotheses about the reasons for rising inequality and refer-
ences to related research.150 Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
29. We construct birth and death retiming weights from accurate data on the timing of
births and deaths using a conditional logit model. The model includes controls for state,
metro, and rural areas and job creation and destruction rates. The model is run separately
by 2-digit SIC and for four different 5-year census cycles.
30. There are between 40,000 and 120,000 cases each year. Work by Davis et. al. (2005)
shows that business transitions between employer and non-employer status explains
some of these cases.
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Data Appendix
A Additional Information about the LBD
This appendix discusses improvements to the LBD that aided the analysis in
this paper. The LBD is comprised of longitudinally linked Business Register
(BR) files. The BR is updated continuously and a snapshot is taken once a year
after the incorporation of survey data collections. The resulting files containVolatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates 153
a longitudinal establishment identifier, the Permanent Plant Number (PPN).
This identifier is designed to remain unchanged throughout the life of the estab-
lishment and regardless of reorganizations or ownership changes. However,
there are known breaks in PPN linkages, and PPNs existed only for the man-
ufacturing sector prior to 1982. Jarmin and Miranda (2002a) addressed these
shortcomings in the BR files in creating the LBD. Their methodology employed
existing numeric establishment identifiers to the greatest extent possible to
repair and construct longitudinal establishment links. They further enhanced
the linkages using commercially available statistical name and address match-
ing software.
Construction of the longitudinal establishment links is relatively straight-
forward because they are one to one, and because establishments typically
have well-defined physical locations. The construction of firm links requires
additional work. Longitudinal linkages of firm identifiers can be broken by
the expansion of single location firms to multi establishment entities and
by merger and acquisition (M&A) activity. We address the first problem by
assigning a unique firm identifier to firms that expand from single to multiple
establishments. This process is straightforward because we can track estab-
lishments over time. The second problem is harder to resolve, because M&A
activity can result in many-to-many matches, e.g., when a firm sells some estab-
lishments and acquires others in the same period. We do not directly address
this issue in the current paper, but we recognize that it would be interesting
to explore the role of M&A activity in greater depth, and we plan to do so in
future work.
The combination and reconciliation of administrative and survey data
sources in the LBD lead to a more serious problem that we have addressed in
the current analysis. Early versions of the LBD contain a number of incorrectly
timed establishment births and deaths. To see how this timing problem arises,
recall that the LBD is a longitudinally linked version of the Business Register.
Although the primary unit of observation in the BR is a business establishment
(physical location), administrative data are typically available at the taxpayer
ID (EIN) level. As the vast majority of firms are single establishment entities,
the EIN, firm, and establishment levels of aggregation all refer to the same busi-
ness entity. Business births typically enter the BR from administrative sources.
Outside of Economic Census years, however, the Census Bureau directly sur-
veys only large births, as measured by payroll. In Economic Census years, all
establishments of "known" multi location firms are directly surveyed. A subset
of larger single location businesses are canvassed as well.
The Census Bureau separately identifies the individual establishments of
multi-establishment companies based on primary data collections from the
Economic Census and certain annual surveys such as the Company Organiza-
tion Survey and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers. Since a much larger por-154 Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
tion of firms and establishments are surveyed in Economic Census years (years
ending in "2" and "7"), the Economic Census becomes the primary vehicle by
which the Census Bureau learns about establishment entry and exit for smaller
multi-unit firms. This information is then incorporated into the LBD. The impli-
cation is that the unadjusted LBD files show large spikes in establishment births
and deaths for multi-unit firms in Economic Census years. Many of those births
and deaths actually occurred in the previous four years.
We retime these incorrectly timed deaths and births following a two-phase
methodology, described more fully in Jarmin and Miranda (2005). The first
phase uses firm level information contained in the LBD to identify the correct
birth and death years for as many establishments as possible. The second phase
adapts an algorithm developed by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) to
randomly assign a birth or death year for those cases that cannot be resolved
in phase one. The randomization procedure is constrained so that the tempo-
ral patterns of births and deaths for retimed cases match those for the accu-
rately timed births and deaths that we observe directly in the data (single-unit




Finally, the LBD contains a substantial number of establishments that appear
to become inactive for a period of time (Jarmin and Miranda 2002b). That is,
the establishment is active in period t-\ and t + 1 but not in period t.
30 These
gaps lead to possibly spurious startups and shutdowns. In this paper, we take a
conservative approach by eliminating these establishment-year observations in
the entry and exit computations. Our goal in doing so is to focus on true entry
and exit.
B COMPUSTAT-LBD Employment Comparisons
The top panel in figure 2A.1 compares log employment levels between COM-
PUSTAT and the LBD data sources for a matched set of publicly traded firms.
The lower panel compares five-year growth rates, calculated according to equa-
tion (4). Here, we restrict attention to matched firms that have positive employ-
ment in the LBD and COMPUSTAT. Much of the mass is concentrated along
the 45 degree line in the top panel, but there are clearly many large discrepan-
cies between the two data sources. The simple correlation of log employment
levels is 0.89 on an unweighted basis and 0.83 on an employment-weighted
basis. The standardized employment difference, measured as LBD employ-
ment minus COMPUSTAT employment divided by the average of the two, has
an unweighted median value of -13 percent and an unweighted mean of -26
percent. The weighted values are -25 percent for the median and -30 percent
for the mean. The lower panel shows a weaker relationship for growth rates,Volatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates 155
with a correlation of 0.64 unweighted and 0.54 weighted. Lower values for the
weighted correlations probably reflect bigger discrepancies for multi-national
firms with significant global operations.
In short, the results in figure 2.1 indicate that COMPUSTAT measures of firm
level activity contain considerable measurement error, if the goal is to measure
the U.S. domestic operations of publicly traded firms. Despite the large COM-
PUSTAT-LBD differences in employment levels and growth rates, the two data
sources produce similar trends in firm volatility measures, as seen by compar-
ing figures 2.4, 2.5, and 2.7.156 Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda
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Figure 2A.1
Comparisons of Employment levels (logs) and Employment Growth Rates for LBD and
COMPUSTAT Matched Firms (Pooled 1994-2001)Comment
Christopher Foote, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Sixteen years ago, Steven Davis and John Haltiwanger's paper for the
NBER Macroeconomics Annual was among the first to use firm-level
data to study employment fluctuations. The focus of the current paper,
written with Ron Jarmin and Javier Miranda, is on a different piece of
the employment picture. The authors argue that during the past two
decades, employment levels at individual firms and establishments
have become more stable. Their preferred measure of firm volatility
for the U.S. private sector, displayed in figure 2.6, declines by about
one-quarter from 1978 to 2001.1 am confident that like Davis and Halti-
wanger (1990), this thoughtful paper will influence both empirical and
theoretical work long after its publication.
In this comment, I will explore three main themes, with the first two
involving measurement issues. I begin by developing some intuition
for the author's preferred volatility statistic. This intuition illustrates
why their results are admittedly sensitive to the treatment of firm entry
and exit. My second point involves the relationship between microeco-
nomic volatility and business cycles. The paper does an excellent job of
highlighting why this relationship is interesting; some theoretical mod-
els predict that both types of volatility should decline as an economy
develops, while other models claim that macro and micro volatility
should move in opposite directions. My own view is that without tak-
ing account of micro-level adjustment costs, setting down the stylized
facts in this literature will be difficult. Finally, my third point is that it
seems highly likely that some decrease in idiosyncratic volatility has
indeed occurred, based on the results of this paper and some worker-
based data cited in the paper. This decrease has no doubt contributed to
the decline in the U.S. unemployment rate during the past two decades.
As a result, the authors' research agenda may prove integral to answer-158 Foote
ing a question on the minds of many policymakers: Why has the natu-
ral rate of unemployment fallen so much?
1 Measuring Firm-level Volatility and Dispersion
Economists discuss employment volatility all the time. However, typi-
cally the volatility occurs in some going concern, like an entire econ-
omy, or a big, publicly traded firm. The authors' data are distinguished
by the inclusion of all firms in the United States (a monumental accom-
plishment) and most of these firms are small, with high entry and exit
rates. To probe these data, the authors apply some previous variance
statistics and develop a new, preferred one, "modified firm-level vola-
tility" (equation 6). The new statistic allows data from even short-lived
firms to contribute to overall volatility averages.
To gain some intuition for the modified volatility statistic, I worked
through some examples using simulated data from individual firms.
Figure 2.16 presents data from one such firm. The firm is born with
100 employees in year 0. Employment (the solid line) remains constant
at 100 until year 35, when it begins to cycle annually between 100 and
150 employees. Modified volatility (the dotted line) starts out high
at 0.63, reflecting the high "growth rate" registered in the birth year
(7= 2). By year 5, the rolling standard deviation moves past this initial
growth rate, so volatility falls to zero, as we would expect for a firm
with constant employment. In period 30, modified volatility begins to
rise in anticipation of the cycling phase, because this statistic is a cen-
tered standard deviation of past, current, and future /s. During the
cycling phase, the firm's /s (not shown) alternate between -0.4 and 0.4,
and modified volatility stabilizes to about 0.42.
1
I would think that a firm that cycles annually between 100 and 150
employees would have a lot of jittery employees. If this level of volatil-
ity reflected the stability of employment in the United States, most of us
would arrive at work each day fearing pink slips on our desks! Accord-
ing to figure 2.6, however, employment-weighted modified volatility in
the U.S. private sector is greater than 0.4 almost every year from 1977
and 2001. The reason for this high measured volatility is entry and exit.
Note that for our sample firm, the highest modified volatility comes in
the year immediately following its birth—thanks to the y=2 recorded
in its initial year—even though employment is constant for the firm's

















































Just as interesting is what happens when a firm is short-lived, so that
it contributes both a birth and a death to the data. In these cases, the
modified volatility statistic may have problems distinguishing between
short-lived firms that are truly volatile and those that are not. I calcu-
lated modified volatility for two simulated firms that each operated for
four years. In one firm, the employment sequence was 100, 200, 300,
400, 0 while a second, less volatile firm had employment of 100, 100,
100,100, 0. The modified volatility statistic for the first firm was indeed
larger than that of the second, but not by much. In each year of the data,
the first firm's modified volatility was 1.19, but the stable firm's statistic
only marginally smaller, at 1.12. The likely reason for this similarity
is that the /s of 2 and -2 that bookend both of these firms' histories
are dominating their modified volatility statistics, so that the statistic is
unable to distinguish much difference in volatility between them.
2
The implication of these simulations is that fluctuations in the num-
ber of births and deaths in the economy are likely to have a large impact
on economywide volatility that may not accurately reflect underlying
theoretical concepts. Indeed, the authors' figure 2.8 shows that exclud-
ing births and deaths causes the average level of modified volatility
to decline by about one-third. More importantly for our purposes, the
authors point out that the decline in volatility among privately held
firms also becomes less pronounced, relative to their preferred figure
2.6. In fact, modified volatility for the entire economy is essentially flat
over the sample period when entry and exit are left out.
The issue is just as important for the other variance statistic discussed
by the authors, the cross-sectional distribution of /s in any particular
year. To make a trivial point, both an entry 7 of 2 and an exit 7 of -2
get larger in absolute value when they are squared for a calculation of
cross-sectional standard deviation. But squaring shrinks the contribu-
tion of firms with more modest growth rates (7 < 1). As a result, births
and deaths of even small firms can have exceptionally large influences
on the time-series pattern of cross-sectional dispersion. It is not hard to
come up with examples in which the entry or exit decision of a tiny firm
makes a big difference for employment-weighted dispersion in a sector
that includes many large firms.
3
The authors make a strong case that entry and exit should not be
ignored when discussing idiosyncratic volatility, despite the associ-
ated measurement difficulties. When Wal-Mart enters a market and
pushes out smaller, more volatile firms, employment volatility in the
labor market declines in part because Wal-Mart is less likely to likelyComment 161
to go out of business than the stores it replaces. My concern is that I
don't have a good feel for the quantitative impact that entry and exit
should have on measures of economywide volatility. There is no obvi-
ous way to answer this question, given the difficulty of translating the
infinite percentage changes in employment that occur upon entry and
exit into some growth rate that can contribute to an economywide vol-
atility average. The authors' growth rate (7) equals 2 upon an entry,
but why shouldn't this number be 4? Or 1? By implication, how do we
know that the author's preferred figure 2.6 does a better job of inform-
ing theoretical work on this topic than figure 2.8, where entry and exit
are excluded?
2 Aggregate Shocks, Idiosyncratic Variance, and the Great
Moderation
My second point is that the empirical separation of trends in aggregate
vs. idiosyncratic volatility is likely more difficult that it would appear
at first glance. In recent years, there has been an explosion of theoretical
work on firm-level volatility. Among other things, this work explores
the implications of changes in research and development intensity,
better diversification through financial markets, and a wider basket of
potential inputs to production. This research also asks how changes
in idiosyncratic volatility are likely to affect volatility at the aggregate
level. For example, could microeconomic factors leading to higher or
lower firm-level volatility help explain the Great Moderation in the U.S
business cycle since the mid-1980s?
This research generally concerns the volatility of desired employ-
ment at firms, but desired employment differs from the actual employ-
ment we see in data when there are firm-level adjustment costs. One of
the most important lessons we have learned from micro-level employ-
ment data in the past two decades is that these costs should not be
ignored. Changes in either employment or capital stocks on the micro
level are usually much less frequent and much larger than we would
expect under convex adjustment costs (or no costs at all). This pattern
is typically explained by some non-convexity in adjustment costs, of
which the simple (S,s) model is the best-known example.
4
Non-convex adjustment costs draw a sharp distinction between the
observed level of employment at firms and the desired level, with the
latter denoting the employment level that would obtain if adjustment
costs were momentarily suspended. In turn, the distinction between162 Foote
actual and desired employment makes it difficult to isolate aggregate
shocks in the data. This is because only a few firms are likely to adjust
actual employment when an aggregate shock occurs, even though the
shock may affect desired employment at all firms in the same way.
Think of a negative aggregate shock that reduces desired employment
for all firms. In an (S,s) world, this shock will push some firms over
the "reduce employment" boundary, so they will reduce employment a
great deal. The other firms just move closer to this boundary, remaining
inside the (S,s) inaction region.
What is more, the presence of non-convex adjustment costs can con-
fuse the relationship between aggregate volatility and firm-level volatil-
ity. Consider again the implications of a negative aggregate shock. The
fact that some firms are pushed over the reduce-employment bound-
ary shows up in the data as an increase in the dispersion of firm-level
employment changes. After all, some firms have adjusted employment
a great deal, while others have kept employment stable.
This empirical regularity is important for interpreting Davis and
Haltiwanger's 1990 paper, one of the first to explore the relation-
ship between aggregate and firm-level volatility. Using a dataset that
included establishment-level data from the manufacturing industry
alone, that paper found that the recessions of 1975 and 1982 were peri-
ods of intense reallocation in the manufacturing sector, as measured
(for example) by a measure of dispersion in the absolute value of
employment changes at the microeconomic level This led them and a
number of other 1990s authors to explore the possibility that recessions
and interfirm employment reallocation were theoretically linked, per-
haps because recessions were in a time of low aggregate productivity
(so that the opportunity costs of suspending production for reallocation
fell in recessions). The recessions-as-reallocations theory suffered when
confronted with other data, however. In other countries (Boeri 1996) or
in non-manufacturing industries (Foote 1998), reallocation often looked
procyclical, as the cross-sectional distribution of employment growth
rate spread out in booms, not recessions. A simple explanation for this
discrepancy is that an intense aggregate shock in any direction will cause
measured microlevel dispersion to rise in an (S,s) world. If the data
covers a period of intense positive shocks, microeconomic dispersion
will look procyclical. If instead the most intense aggregate shocks are
negative, then dispersion will look countercyclical.
Now consider the more recent lines of inquiry into micro and macro
volatility. Section 2 of the paper states that there is a "simple mechani-Comment 163
cal reason to anticipate that micro and macro volatility will trend in
the same direction." I would elaborate on this statement, adding that
under non-convex adjustment costs, there is a mechanical reason why
a period of less-intense aggregate shocks will also be periods of lower
idiosyncratic variation. So, theories that predict that micro and macro
volatility trend in the same direction may be "vindicated" by the data,
even if there is no underlying relationship between business cycles and
idiosyncratic volatility in the desired employment of firms.
A unifying theme of my first two points is that asking simple ques-
tions of microeconomic data can be harder that it seems, due in part
to the granular nature of employment change at the microeconomic
level. Rather than curse our fate at having to deal with the associated
measurement issues, I think we should instead be encouraged to con-
tinue to develop empirical models that highlight distinctions between
desired and actual employment. Those who would test recent theories
on the relationship between aggregate and idiosyncratic volatility will
undoubtedly find these models useful.
3 Firm-level Idiosyncratic Variance and Workers Flows
Despite my concerns regarding measurement issues, I am quite com-
fortable with the idea that some decline in idiosyncratic volatility has
recently occurred. As the authors point out, their results dovetail nicely
with worker-based data. Their figure 2.14 correlates firm-level volatil-
ity with flows into and out of unemployment, with the latter two flows
expressed as fractions of the labor force. I believe that the point can
be made more forcefully by looking at the data in a different way. My
figure 2.17 graphs the average monthly probability that an employed
worker will separate into unemployment, as calculated by Robert
Shimer. The data are quarterly averages of monthly rates from 1960:1
to 2004:4. Focusing on the separation rate is useful because this rate is
closely related to reallocational intensity in search-and-matching mod-
els of the labor market (Pissarides 2000, Chapter 1). The main feature
of the graph is the low-frequency rise and fall in separations after 1970.
Because the trend unemployment rate is essentially the ratio of the sep-
aration rate to the sum of separation and finding rates, this movement
in separations is a prime determinant of low-frequency movements in
the overall unemployment rate as well.
5
As the authors point out, one potential source for movements in sepa-



































1957, so a lot of young people—with high separation rates—are enter-
ing the labor market near the time when separations are highest. Yet
movements in separations are probably too large to attribute to demo-
graphics alone, as attempts to link recent trends in overall unemploy-
ment solely to demographics have typically failed (Katz and Krueger
1999). Something else besides demographics must also be causing the
separation rate to move, and, by extension, driving the trend in the
overall unemployment rate. But what?
A great deal of ink has been spilled on sources of the recent decline
in the natural unemployment rate, most of it focused on the question
from the worker's point of view. I think it likely that at least part of
the answer will be found in firm-side data of the type that the authors
employ. In light of this, the results in the paper's table 2.2 are especially
tantalizing. At least among privately held firms, declines in volatility
from 1978 to 2001 are strikingly similar across industries, ranging from
a low of 22.6 percent in Mining to 38.3 percent in Wholesale Trade. This
similarity could rule out some explanations for declining volatility
while supporting others.
4 Conclusion
The four authors of this paper are to be commended for the care in
which they have constructed these data and the imagination they have
used in analyzing them. As their research agenda develops, I would
press them to clarify the measurement issues I have discussed as well
as further explore the links between firm-side data to unemployment
trends. Like many in both the policy and academic worlds, I will be
interested to learn what they find.
Endnotes
1. The volatility statistic would be of course be invariant to scaling the firm's employment
history by some constant factor, which would leave the sequence of /s unchanged.
2. A firm in existence for only one year contributes two observations of 2.83 to modified
volatility, no matter what its size.
3. Consider an industry with ten firms. Nine of the firms have employment weights of
1,000 (that is average employment in t and t - 1 of 1,000), and their /s are distributed
between -0.02 and 0.02 (three with / = -0.02, three with y = 0.02, one with y = -0.01, and
two with y= 0.01). The tenth firm has four employees, and either keeps employment con-
stant (7=0, employment weight = 4) or drops employment to zero (/ = -2, employment
weight = 2). If the tenth firm keeps employment constant, the employment weighted166 Foote
standard deviation of the ten firms will equal 0.0182. If the tenth firm exits, this statistic
nearly doubles, to 0.0363.
4. In an (S,s) world, firms keep the deviation of desired-from-actual employment
bounded, changing employment only when this deviation crosses either the "S" or "s"
boundary. A generalization of the (S,s) model is the upward-sloping hazard model, which
states that the probability ("hazard rate") for employment adjustment rises as the devia-
tion of desired-from-actual employments gets larger (Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger
1997). The (S,s) model is an extreme version of this framework, in which the hazard rate is
0 inside the (S,s) region and 1 outside of it. To my knowledge, there is little disagreement
over whether non-convex adjustment costs are important at the micro level, although
there is considerable disagreement over whether these non-convexities matter for macro-
economic dynamics (Thomas (2002), Veracierto (2002)) as well as disputes over the pre-
cise way in which micro-level models should be specified and estimated (Cooper and
Willis (2004), Cabellero and Engel (2004)).
5. Indeed, Shimer (2005) argues that business cycle variability in unemployment should
be credited to the finding rate, not the separation rate, in contrast to previous research.
It seems reasonable that lower frequency movements would then be driven in large part
by the separation rate.
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1 Introduction
The work of Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (henceforth,
DHJM) is a very informative piece of work that brings new and more
comprehensive data to the active research area of business volatility.
Just last year at the Macroeconomics Annual, Comin and Phillipon
(henceforth, CP) were examining the change in business volatility that
took place in recent decades and its relation to the change in aggre-
gate volatility. DHJM confirm the findings of CP that the volatility of
publicly-held firms increased recently, but show that the features of the
COMPUSTAT data used by CP do not generalize to all firms, since there
are important differences in the business volatility trend of publicly-
traded versus privately-held firms.
To show just how exhaustive the LBD data DHJM use are, in table
2.6,1 compare the employment numbers from the Current Employment
Statistics, the Bureau of Labor Statistics' most comprehensive survey of
payroll employment in private nonfarm industries, for 1980,1990, and
2000, with the employment numbers for the same segment of the econ-
omy from the LBD. As can be seen, in all years, the LBD covers essen-
tially all employment in private nonfarm industries, of which only a
little over a quarter takes places in publicly-traded firms.
I view the DHJM piece as the beginning of an exciting new research
program using the rich data available in the LBD. In my discussion, I
would like to offer some suggestions as to how one might use these
data to address questions that are at the core of macroeconomic research
today. First, I discuss whether the distinction between publicly-traded
versus privately-held businesses matters for macroeconomics and
whether the LBD data are well-suited to study this distinction further.
Second, I discuss the macroeconomic implications of the decline in168 Nagypal
Table 2.6
Comparison of Private Nonfarm Employment in All Firms and in Publicly-Traded Firms
















Source: CES from Bureau of Labor Statistics, LBD from DHJM.
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business volatility and relate it to the decline in aggregate volatility that
has taken place recently. Finally, I offer some thoughts on how one might
interpret the decline in business volatility observed in the LBD data.
2 Ownership Structure: Should Macroeconomists Care?
DHJM repeatedly stress in their paper the difference in the volatility
trends of publicly-traded versus privately-held firms. For example,
in their table 2.2, DHJM document that the volatility of employment
growth in publicly-traded firms and in privately-held firms has shown
very different trends between 1978 and 2001: The first increased by 55.5
percent while the second declined by 33.4 percent. Given the predom-
inance of privately-held businesses, the overall volatility of business
growth rates has also declined over the same period by 22.9 percent.
At an elementary level, these divergent trends mean that there has
been a change in the way publicly-traded businesses are selected from
the universe of all businesses. This phenomenon has received consider-
able attention lately in the finance literature. Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel,
and Xu (2001) document a more than two-fold rise in the idiosyncratic
variance of stock returns between 1962 and 1997 and speculate that
some of this increase could have been due to the replacement of con-
glomerates with companies focused on a single economic activity and
the tendency of firms to issue stocks earlier in their life-cycle. Fama and
French (2004) provide evidence that not only did new listings become
more numerous since 1980, but their profitability became progressively
more left skewed and their growth became more right skewed.
This change in selection can have important macroeconomic con-
sequences. For example, if the nature of financing affects investmentComment 169
decisions, then the easier access of younger and smaller businesses to
public financing could impact aggregate investment activity. Or, if the
nature of financing affects innovation and thereby productivity growth
at the firm level, then easier access to public financing would affect
aggregate productivity growth. While these are interesting hypotheses
to entertain, a limitation of the LBD data used by DHJM is that they
do not contain information on the investment or innovation activity
of businesses, only on their employment and payroll. So macroecono-
mists have many potential reasons to care about the changing owner-
ship structure, but it is not clear that the LBD data are well-suited to
study these issues further.
3 Macro Effects of the Business Volatility Decline
As is well-known by now, there has been a considerable decline in the
volatility of most aggregate variables in recent decades (often referred
to as the "Great Moderation"), though there is disagreement about
the exact timing and nature of this decline (McConnell and Perez-
Quiros 2000, Stock and Watson 2002, and Blanchard and Simon 2001).
I document the decline in the volatility of the growth of private non-
farm employment—the most relevant aggregate measure for the LBD
data—in figure 2.18. Panel a) plots the 12-month growth rate of private
nonfarm employment and panel b) shows the standard deviation of
the 12-month growth rate using a ten-year moving window. Clearly,
the volatility of private nonfarm employment has declined from the
1940s to the 1960s, picked up in the 1970s and then declined again since
1980.
How does this aggregate trend relate to the trend in idiosyncratic vol-
atility? To clarify ideas, let us consider the simplest model of business
growth rate and assume that firm/'s growth rate at time t is determined
by an aggregate growth shock, Z(, with variance a
2zt, and an idiosyn-
cratic growth shock, et, with variance G\, that is independent across
firms and of the aggregate shock:
^ = AW (i)
Assuming that there are N firms in the economy, the aggregate growth
rate is
7, = Z
 ajt7jt = AZ, + £ ccjtejt, (2)
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b) Standard deviation of the 12-month growth rate of private nonfarm employment using
a 10-year moving window between 1945 and 2001.
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Figure 2.18
Volatility of the Growth Rate of Private Nonfarm Employment
Source: CES from Bureau of Labor Statistics.Comment 171
where ajt is the share of firm; in total employment. The variance of the
aggregate growth rate then is
J K (3)
The role of idiosyncratic variability in influencing aggregate variability
is thus determined by the size of the term £
N=1 a
2r If all businesses are
of the same size, then T
Nj=1 a
2jt = 1/N. With close to 5,000,000 firms in the
economy, the term Z




so that idiosyncratic shocks play no role in determining the variability
of the aggregate growth rate.
Of course, not all firms in the economy are of the same size, and
the presence of large firms could influence the above calculations, as
argued by Gabaix (2005). A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation
based on the 50 largest U.S. private employers as reported by Fortune




2,t contributes at most 10 percent to the variance of
aggregate employment growth. So, to understand changes in aggregate
volatility, it is critical to understand the part of aggregate volatility that
comes from aggregate disturbances.
In the context of the present paper, though, isolating aggregate dis-
turbances is not straightforward to do, since DHJM measure weighted






Thus the DHJM measure is a sum of the idiosyncratic risk term <7
2
which has limited influence on aggregate volatility, and of the aggre-
gate disturbance term, P
2ta\t. To isolate the aggregate component (or
more generally comovement among firms in an industry, or region), a
possible econometric specification could be
y.t=f(dj,dt,Xjt,yjt_1,ejt), . (6)
where d. is a firm fixed effect, dt is a time effect identifying time trends in
growth rates common across firms, and X.f are time-varying firm char-
acteristics, such as size and age.172 Nagypal
With the rich data available in the LBD, by extracting a common
component across different industries and studying its volatility, one
could answer many interesting questions relating to the Great Modera-
tion (GM). For example, was there a GM in all segments of economy?
When did the GM start? Did it start at the same time in all segments of
economy? Is the GM related to jobless recoveries as hypothesized by
Koenders and Rogerson (2005)? Was the GM due to falling correlation
between segments of the economy?
The last question of falling correlations among segments of the
economy is all the more relevant, since not only could this account for
the fall in aggregate volatility, but there is also evidence supporting its
empirical validity. Assume that the aggregate growth shock, Z(, in the
above framework is composed of two separate fundamental shocks







2 varZ2f +2j81j82covar(Zlf/Z2,), (8)
so a fall in the correlation of the two shocks would immediately imply
a fall in the variance of the aggregate component.
The empirical relevance of this falling correlation is suggested by the
fact that the correlation among the eight major private nonfarm sectors
has fallen since the early 1980s, exactly the same period that aggregate
volatility has fallen. To show this, in figure 2.19,1 plot the average pair-
wise correlation between the 12-month growth rate of employment in
eight major private nonfarm sectors using a ten-year moving window,
both weighted by sectoral employment and unweighted.
Of course, the most important outstanding question about the Great
Moderation is whether it was due to a change in the size of the shocks,
i.e., a result of smaller exogenous or policy shocks, or to a change in
the transmission mechanism from shocks to outcomes that took
place due to a shift from goods to services, to better inventory manage-
ment, to innovations in financial markets, or to a changing composition
of the workforce. Putting this question into the context of the above
simple model, did var(^) decline because a\t declined or because f$t
declined?
With regards to this question, it is not immediately clear how the
microdata of the LBD can help, since just as the aggregate data, theyComment 173
Figure 2.19
Average Pairwise Correlation between the 12-Month Growth Rate of Employment in the
Eight Major Private Nonfarm Sectors, Ten-Year Moving Window, Unweighted (Thick
Line) and Weighted (Dotted Line)
Source: CES from Bureau of Labor Statistics.
contain a joint P]<J
2zt term. In fact, due to the lack of identification, there
is no purely statistical method that allows one to disentangle the effects
of smaller shocks and of changing transmission, so one needs to look
at the data through the lens of a theoretical model to make identifi-
cation possible. Nonetheless, a better understanding of the time path
and nature of the Great Moderation by using micro data could be very
informative in shaping our thinking about this important macroeco-
nomic question.
4 Interpreting the Decline in Business Volatility
DHJM state that in their paper they are giving "empirical indicators for
the intensity of idiosyncratic shocks." This is one possible interpretation
of their results. Even if one accepts that the overall decline is not simply
a result of a change in the composition of observables among U.S. busi-
nesses, the decline in the volatility of the growth rate of an individual
producer could be due to a decline in the shocks that affect this pro-
ducer or to a change in the producer's environment and /or behavior.
This is the same issue of shocks versus transmission that arises with
regards to aggregate volatility.174 Nagypal
To demonstrate this distinction and to highlight the usefulness
of looking at the data through the lens of a theory, let us consider a
simple model. To be able to talk about employment determination and
employment volatility at the firm level, one needs a model of employ-
ment determination with frictions. One such model is due to Bentolila
and Bertola (1990), where the frictions take the simple form of adjust-
ment costs.
Assume that there is a monopolist firm that maximizes its discounted
profits using discount rate r and at each instant faces a downward-
sloping demand function, Qt = Z(P(~
1/(1^, where 0 < ju < 1, Qt is the
firm's output at time t, Pt is the price it charges at time t, and Zf is a sto-
chastic demand shock, where Zf follows a geometric Brownian motion,
dZt = OZtdt + aZtdWt. Assume that output is linear in labor, the only
input into production, which has a fixed flow cost of w.
There is exogenous worker attrition at rate 8. In addition to this attri-
tion (for which the firm pays no adjustment cost), the firm can decide to
hire or fire workers. If the firm fires workers, then it has to pay a firing
cost of cf per unit of labor. If the firm hires workers, then it has to pay a
hiring cost of ch per unit of labor.
In this environment, it is straightforward to show that the optimal
policy of the firm is to keep the ratio Lt/Zt in an interval [lh, /,], so that
the firm starts hiring if Lt is to fall below lhZt and starts firing if L( is to
exceed lZf. For a given set of model parameters, one can then calculate
the optimal inaction interval [lh, I], and simulate the stochastic path of
the firm's employment over time. Performing such a simulation given
an annual attrition rate of 8 = 0.10 and a demand volatility parameter of
<7= 0.15 and calculating the DHJM measure of firm-level employment
volatility gives a volatility measure of 0.108 as can be seen in the first
column of table 2.7.
1
Now let us assume that we see the volatility of the same firm's employ-
ment decline to 0.084. What could explain such a decline? It turns out
that there are several possible explanations. First, as column 2 of table
2.7 shows, the decline in firm-level volatility could be due to a decline
in the size of the demand shocks, with a being reduced from 0.15 to
0.10. This would be a shocks-based explanation. Second, as column 3
of table 2.7 shows, the same decline could be due to a change in 8, the
exogenous attrition rate, from 0.10 to 0.05. Such a decline in the exog-
enous attrition rate in the 1980s and 1990s could accompany an aging
of the workforce that took place as the baby boom generation became
older, since it is well-known that older workers have much lower ratesComment 175
Table 2.7
DHJM Volatility Measure and Adjustment Frequency for Different Parameter Specifica-
tions in the Employment Determination Model with Adjustment Costs




DHJM volatility 0.108 0.084 0.084
Adjustment frequency 8.5 weeks 6 weeks 15.4 weeks
of exogenous attrition than younger workers. This, of course, would be
a transmission-based explanation, since here the change in the firm's
environment led to a decline in firm-level volatility.
So it is clear that the decline in firm-level volatility need not neces-
sarily imply a reduction in the size of the shocks that the firm experi-
ences, rather it could be due to other changes in the firm's environment.
The advantage of having an explicit model is that it can give us ways
to disentangle the two possible reasons for the decline in volatility. In
particular, in the above simple model, the two sources of the decline
in firm-level volatility could be distinguished by looking at the aver-
age time between adjustments of the firm's workforce. In the case of
smaller shocks, the average time to adjust declines, since now the firm
faces less risk and is willing to take advantage even of small changes
in demand (i.e., the region of inactivity shrinks). In the case of lower
exogenous attrition due to the baby boomers getting older, the average
time to adjust increases, since now the firm needs to do replacement
hiring less often.
Of course, these simple calculations are only demonstrative, since
they rely on an easily calculable partial-equilibrium model with some
restrictive assumptions, but they demonstrate how one might use a the-
oretical model to think about the rich data studied in DHJM. Campbell
and Fisher (2004) develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model with similar features.
5 Conclusions
To conclude, it is worth reiterating that the LBD contains great new data
to study business dynamics and to guide our thinking about impor-
tant macro questions. The paper by DHJM presents some very nice
and thought-provoking findings and is certainly only the beginning of176 Nagypal
an exciting new research program. The finding, in particular, that the
volatility trends of all firms do not coincide with the volatility trends
of publicly-held firms that have been studied in previous papers cer-
tainly deserves attention, since it changes the basic stylized fact that the
growing theoretical literature connecting business-level volatility with
aggregate volatility must confront.
One interesting way to push this research agenda forward, especially
in its relation to macroeconomics, is to bring more theory to the inter-
pretation of data, since some important questions regarding the source
of the decline in aggregate volatility are not possible to answer without
it.
Endnote
1. The other parameters are set at annual values of r = 0.05, 6 = 0.012, JU = 0.5, w = \,cf =
0.5, and ch = 0.5. Details of the calculations and simulations are available upon request.
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Diego Comin began the discussion by raising several points. He noted
that it was entirely possible for time series and cross-sectional measures
of firm volatility to behave very differently. While the cross-sectional
measures of volatility capture the dispersion of the distribution of firm
growth, the time-series measures of volatility get at the changes in a
firm's position within this distribution. He mentioned that in work with
Sunil Mulani, he had found that turnover had increased more in the
COMPUSTAT sample. Using sales data rather than employment data,
they furthermore found a decrease in the cross-sectional measure of
volatility in the COMPUSTAT sample. Thomas Philippon remarked
that similar trends vis-a-vis the convergence in cross-sectional volatility
between private and publicly-traded firms had been observed in French
data.
Comin noted that if the authors' conclusions are correct, they are par-
ticularly interesting because they help distinguish between different
explanations that have been put forward regarding the upward trend
in the volatility of public companies. In particular, he saw the authors'
evidence as supporting Schumpeterian models in which firms that do
a disproportionate amount of R&D, such as public firms, experience
larger increases in volatility. On the other hand, he saw the authors' evi-
dence as posing a challenge for models that stress financial frictions.
Comin emphasized the importance of controlling for compositional
change by including firm fixed effects in the regressions. He noted that
while the results could be driven by compositional change, in his own
work on the COMPUSTAT sample, he had found that this was not the
case. He noted that his results were also robust to the inclusion of age
effects, size effects and to different weighting schemes, and said that he
would like to see whether the results in the paper were robust to these
effects as well.178 Discussion
Both Comin and Philippon noted that while the firms in the COMPU-
STAT sample accounted for only about one-third of total U.S. employ-
ment, they accounted for a much larger fraction of value added in the
economy. This implied that the weights were very different if firms
were weighted by sales rather than employment. John Haltiwanger
agreed that it was important to look at measures of activity other than
employment. He noted that the LBD data set was particularly good
for the employment variable, whereas investigating other measures
would require significant additional work to construct these variables.
Regarding entry and exit, Haltiwanger said that the results would not
change significantly if sales weights were used instead of employment
weights.
Daron Acemoglu cautioned against implicitly adopting a steady-state
view of the economy when thinking about firm volatility. He noted that
the entry of a large retail firm like Wal-mart in a particular local mar-
ket typically induces a spike in hiring and firing activity, and this non
steady-state phenomenon should affect the interpretation given to the
empirical results. He also suggested that monotonic selection of less
risky firms into public listing was not necessarily a good assumption.
In response to an improvement in financial development, he argued
that the most risky firms might seek and obtain a public listing since
these firms have the biggest need for risk diversification. This would
imply that the pool of listed firms would contain both old, low-risk
firms and young, high-risk firms. Steven Davis responded that while
the logic of Acemoglu's argument was correct, the quantitative force of
this argument was not strong enough to explain the volatility conver-
gence result.
Philippon said that he thought the take-away message from the paper
was that economists need to think more about the decision of firms to
go public. Two parameters he felt were particularly important in deter-
mining which firms go public are the amount of risk and the amount of
asymmetric information. Firms should be more likely to go public the
more risky they are and the less they are plagued by asymmetric infor-
mation, other things equal. Philippon emphasized that the asymmetric
information in IPOs was a very large phenomenon which led to a large
amount of underpricing. In order to explain the large increase in the
fraction of firms that go public, he felt that it was important to examine
closely the role of improved financial intermediation, such as the rise
of venture capital, in reducing asymmetric information problems. JohnDiscussion 179
Haltiwanger agreed with Philippon's point and said that the authors
were actively working on integrating the information in the LBD with
venture capital data. He noted that with the dataset they had created,
they could study the prehistory of firms that go public.
Andrew Levin urged the authors to think about the possible causal
links between the trends they observe in firm level volatility and the
Great Moderation in macroeconomic volatility since the mid-1980s. He
noted that the causation could go either way and that it was even pos-
sible that there was no link. It seemed to him, however, that the authors
were rather hesitant to draw any link between the Great Moderation
and the trends in firm level volatility that they documented. Olivier
Blanchard wondered whether the difference in volatility between public
and private firms was primarily due to the larger size of public firms.
Responding to the discussants' comments, Haltiwanger noted that
it was reassuring that there were now multiple datasets for the U.S.
based on different sources from which consistent empirical patterns
have emerged. He said that they had emphasized the retail sector in
the paper since they were better able to ascertain the reasonableness
of their results for this sector than for some other sectors. He however
emphasized the pervasiveness of their findings across sectors. He noted
that one potential explanation for the results was a shift in the economy
towards larger national firms, but that many other explanations likely
played a role.
Haltiwanger said that they were confident that the data showed a
decline in entry and exit. He noted that in a large class of models with
frictions, entry and exit played a very important role. He discussed
work that he had done with Steven Davis and Jason Faberman showing
that in the JOLTS data, the employment growth distribution has fat tails
and that in light of this, entry and exit is particularly important.
Ron Jarmin rounded up the discussion by encouraging researchers
to exploit the LBD dataset. He noted that research proposals could be
submitted easily to the Census Bureau (via the Bureau's website) for
access to the dataset.